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Abstract 
 
In the recent years the Russian Government has undertaken serious steps to improve corporate 
governance practices by introducing the Corporate Code of Governance (CCG) and strengthening the 
role of corporate boards to monitor top management performance. This paper investigates whether 
these measures have stimulated positive changes by increasing the demand for higher quality audit. 
We test our hypotheses using 147 non-listed companies to examine whether board composition 
influences audit fee in the Russian capital market. Our findings support the demand-side perspective 
of audit services and suggest that audit fees are associated positively with the presence of an 
independent chairman, higher proportion of independent directors and State representatives on the 
board.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This study examines the empirical relationship 
between board composition and audit fees in the 
Russian capital market.  Board composition is 
defined by the existence of an independent 
chairman on the board, the proportion of 
independent directors and State representatives on 
the board. Recent studies in audit pricing research 
have examined the impact of various corporate 
governance mechanisms on corporate reporting, 
audit quality and level of audit fees (Gul, 2006; 
Abbott et al., 2003; Tsui et al., 2001; Carcello et al., 
2002; Gul and Tsui, 1998). These studies examine 
the relationship between audit fees and corporate 
governance based on the agency theory notion that 
the quality of reported accounting numbers is 
affected by the separation of ownership and control 
(Mitra et al., 2007). Agency theory views managers 
and owners as separate. Managers are regarded as 
having incentive to act in their own interests and to 
misreport financial results for opportunistic reasons 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Prior research on the 
association between corporate governance and audit 
fees has focused primarily on developed capital 
markets (e.g. USA, UK and Australia). Little 
research has been conducted in countries with 
emerging capital markets (Lifschutz et al., 2010). 
No such studies have been conducted in the context 
of the Russian capital market.  
The motivation for this study is twofold. 
First, numerous studies examine the relationship 
between audit fees and corporate governance 
characteristics in settings where companies have 
freedom to determine the composition of boards of 
directors and the State has limited power to appoint 
representatives to the board. In Russia, the 
composition of a board of directors is strictly 
regulated by legislation and listing rules 
requirements. These set a minimum quota for 
independent directors on boards and prohibit CEO 
duality. The large proportion of State shareholding 
also allows the State to exercise a high degree of 
interference in board operations by including its 
representatives as outside directors. The above 
mentioned factors create the unique corporate 
governance environment, explored here. 
Second, there have been limited studies 
exploring the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit fees in emerging economies 
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where the disclosure of audit fees is not mandatory. 
This study examines the association between board 
composition and audit fees in the context of 
Russian capital market.  
Weak corporate governance is perceived as 
one of the reasons for recent corporate scandals 
(Bremer and Elias, 2007). Thus, it seems important 
to examine the association between the recent 
introduction of a corporate governance code in 
Russia and audit fees in that country. Prior studies 
have argued that audit fees are determined from 
either a supply-side or demand-side perspective. 
Studies by Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. 
(2003) produced evidence consistent with the 
demand-side perspective: that is, that governance 
mechanism requiring high-quality audits to reduce 
agency costs lead to higher audit fees being 
charged. Additionally, there is some evidence from 
the supply-side perspective that corporate 
governance mechanisms mitigate agency problems 
in financial reporting and reduce the risk of 
accounting misstatements or irregularities (e.g. Gul 
and Tsui, 1998; Tsui et al., 2001). In our study we 
use board composition to examine the relationship 
with audit fees from a demand-side perspective. We 
argue that the presence of a higher proportion of 
independent directors and the existence of an 
independent chairman on the board leads to higher 
demand for audit work, and that this is reflected in 
higher audit fees. Second, we examine whether the 
presence of representatives of the State on the board 
leads to an increase in perceived inherent risk. 
The key findings are that there are positive 
associations between audit fees and presence of an 
independent chairman on the board, between audit 
fees and the proportion of independent directors, 
and between audit fees and the number of State 
representatives on the board. Our results reveal that 
having an independent chairman and higher 
proportion of independent directors on the board 
are associated with stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms. This requires additional assurance 
from auditors and is reflected in higher audit fees. 
Additionally, the results show that the presence of 
State representatives on the board lowers the level 
of corporate governance, increases the perceived 
inherent audit risk, and leads to higher audit fees.  
The remainder of the study is organized as 
follows. In Section 2 we discuss the corporate 
governance environment in Russia, review the 
theoretical background and develop hypotheses. In 
Section 3 we describe the research design, sample 
selection and data collection. Section 4 tests the 
pricing model. Section 5 contains the summary and 
conclusion including limitations and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses development 
 
Two factors influence an auditor’s fee structure 
(Bell et al., 2001): the risk characteristics of the 
client and the extent of the audit work demanded by 
the client to obtain greater assurance about the 
presentation of information in the financial 
statements. These factors influence the extent of the 
audit work and the risk premium in the quoted fee 
(Mitra et al., 2007). An audit firm will make a fee-
increasing adjustment in situations of high liability 
exposure (Simunic, 1980), mostly through a higher 
level of audit efforts than a pure price premium. 
Bell et al. (2001) conclude that audit fees increase 
as an engagement partner’s assessment of business 
risk increases. They observe that an increase in 
audit fees arises due to an increase in planned audit 
hours, and is indicative of greater audit efforts 
(Mitra et al., 2007). These prior studies indicate that 
audit fees will be higher from the demand-side 
perspective when the scope of audit work increases 
due to client demand. Additionally, the demand-
side perspective suggests a positive association 
between corporate governance characteristics and 
audit fees (e.g. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; 
Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002). The audit 
fee charged by the audit firm will be higher when 
firms with strong corporate governance structure 
demand additional assurance to preserve their 
reputation and avoid potential litigation (Abbott et 
al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002).  
 
2.1. Russian corporate governance 
environment 
 
Russia is one of the largest emerging market 
economies, the eleventh largest economy in the 
world by nominal value, and a world superpower in 
terms of reserves of mineral and energy resources 
(Kokoshin, 2002).  
Drastic economic and political reforms at the 
beginning of 1990s put Russia on the path of 
radical changes in all spheres of life. One of the 
aims of those changes was to transform Russian 
enterprises (which were all State-controlled) into 
independent participants in the market economy. 
The revival of privately owned enterprises in 
Russia started in 1990 with approval of Regulations 
of the Council of Ministers of USSR (Nos 590 and 
601) and the Federal Law on Enterprises and 
Entrepreneurial Activities those gave legal 
definition of companies and entrepreneurship.  
The application of corporate governance 
practices in Russia is regulated by the Federal Law 
on Joint-Stock Companies (adopted in 1995) and 
the Corporate Code of Governance (CCG) 
(introduced in 2002).  Originally, the CCG did not 
have any legal binding force but could issue 
recommendations. One of the positive outcomes of 
the CCG was the introduction of board committees 
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at firm-level. However, in most cases such 
committees were not established until late 2003 due 
to lack of proper enforcement mechanisms (Peng et 
al., 2003). Additional steps to improve application 
of the corporate governance regime were taken in 
2006, when audit committees became a mandatory 
requirement for listed companies (Russian Federal 
Service on Financial Markets, 2002). 
One of the distinctive features of corporate 
governance in Russia from the time of the 
privatization reforms in the 1990s has been 
insiders’ control (Yakovlev, 2004). Lately, there 
has been growing attention to steps taken by the 
Russian Government to overcome it, including 
strengthening the role of the board to monitor top 
management performance. 
Prior to 2004 a traditional structure of a 
Russian board of directors was one that includes 
representatives of the main shareholder and top 
executive management (Filatov et al., 2005). To 
change this, the Federal Law set requirements for 
the minimum number of directors on the board to 
depend on the number of voting shares [1]. All 
directors are elected for a one year term at a regular 
shareholder meeting. A board chairman is elected 
by the directors, approved at a shareholder meeting, 
by a simple majority. One of the distinctive 
characteristics of Russian boards of directors is 
their comparatively severe restrictions regarding 
managers assuming board memberships (Iwasaki, 
2008). A CEO cannot serve as board chairman, and 
senior management cannot occupy more than one-
fourth of the seats on the board.  
The exact board composition at leading 
companies depends on the size of the company, its 
strategic significance to the Russian government, 
and the size of the State’s holding of the share 
capital (Filatov et al., 2005). Despite the general 
belief that Russian corporate boards are heavily 
insider-dominated, nearly half of board directors 
come from outside companies (Iwasaki, 2008). 
However, not all outside directors are independent. 
Apart from independent directors, State 
representatives are also included on boards as 
outside directors. Additionally, in Russian practice 
independent directors are defined broadly; in 
particular, they include minority shareholders’ 
nominees (Appendix A). 
Russian laws do not require companies to 
have independent directors. However, the CCG 
mandates that boards of directors of joint-stock 
companies should include at least three independent 
directors who account for no less than one-fourth of 
the board membership (Appendix A). Vernikov 
(2007) argued that this leads to the situation in 
which most Russian companies appoint 
independent directors just to satisfy listing and law 
requirements or to increase the borrowing capacity 
of the company. Without ‘independent directors’ 
they will be unable to borrow from capital markets 
at reasonable cost or to offer shares successfully to 
investors outside Russia.   
Other outside directors on the board are 
representatives of the State. The majority of 
middle-scale and large-scale enterprises in Russia 
are privatized enterprises. Many of those still have 
some State ownership and representatives on their 
boards (Iwasaki, 2008). This is despite the OECD 
recommending that representatives of the State not 
be members of the board of directors in order to 
avoid conflicts of interest (OECD, 2002). Prior 
studies have shown that the State can have a direct 
or indirect ownership interest in an enterprise (e.g. 
Filatov et al., 2005). With direct State ownership it 
is common for large enterprises to have officers 
from the Presidential Administration or ministers 
and their deputies on boards of directors. For 
example, the board of directors of Inter RAO 
Unified Energy System of Russia, the largest 
company in the power generation and supply 
industry, is dominated by State representatives. In 
2010 outside directors on their board included the 
deputy chairman of the Russian government, 
I.I.Sechin, the Minister of Energy of Russia, S.I. 
Shmatko; and the Head of the Federal Agency for 
State Property Management, Y.A.Petrov. At 
companies the State owns indirectly through other 
enterprises, the board would usually have 
representatives of the parent company as well as 
public officers to give the perception of an 
increased proportion of State members as directors. 
 
2.2. Audit in Russia 
 
Historically, the auditing functions in the former 
Soviet Union were conducted by the revision 
system which was a state-financed system of 
financial control put in place to ensure proper use 
of state resources and to prevent the 
misappropriation of assets at state-owned entities 
(Enthoven et al., 1998; McGee and 
Preobragenskaya, 2005). The development of the 
Western-style auditing started only in the late 1980s 
spurred on by an increase of foreign investment in 
the Russian economy and a growing demand for 
auditing in the developing private sector. However, 
an increase in local audit firms was not supported 
by the development of a regulatory base. This 
promoted ambiguity regarding the scope of audit 
services, and the roles and objectives of auditing 
(Samsonova, 2007), and led to an increase in fraud 
and corruption. At this time, big audit firms entered 
the Russian market and brought with them Western 
audit practices. The promotion of international 
audit rules was further supported by the expansion 
of supranational institutions (e.g. World Bank, 
WTO, OECD, etc.) and thus led to the adoption of 
Western practices by numerous local audit firms 
(Samsonova, 2009).  
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Currently, auditing in Russia is governed by 
the Federal Law on Auditing (2008). To a large 
degree this aligns Russian audit practice with 
International Standards on Auditing and reinforces 
mandatory audit of annual financial reports of 
entities of a particular public interest, including 
those whose securities are traded on a stock 
exchange. According to the Russian Department of 
Finance (2007), at the end of 2006 there were more 
than 7,000 licensed audit firms in Russia with 40% 
of them in Moscow. Big 4 firms controlled 31% of 
the market with the rest serviced by local Russian 
companies.  
Financial reporting in Russia is governed by 
the Federal Law on Accounting (1996) that 
mandates companies prepare their annual reports in 
accord with Russian Accounting Standards. 
However, the Russian Federal Service for Financial 
Markets imposes an additional requirement for 
listed companies: that is to disclose their financial 
information according to either IFRS or US GAAP.  
In the meantime, the disclosure of audit-related 
information is regulated only to a certain extent. 
For example, disclosure of audit fees is not 
mandatory for Russian companies. Additionally, 
neither IFRS nor US GAAP prescribes the 
disclosure of audit fees directly. Thus, the 
additional requirement of compliance with IFRS/ 
US GAAP does not require companies to disclose 
audit fee information. In other countries such 
disclosure is regulated by local versions of 
accounting standards (e.g. AASB101 in Australia) 
or Federal law (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in USA). 
However, such disclosure in Russia is voluntary. 
Thus, the interest of this study is primarily to 
investigate the relationship between board 
composition and audit fee in the context of 
voluntary disclosure of audit-related information. 
 
2.3. Board composition  
 
Board composition in this study is proxied by the 
existence of an independent chairman on the board, 
the proportion of independent directors on the 
board, and the proportion of State representatives 
on the board. Under agency theory, the board of 
directors is an important and feasible element of 
effective corporate control. A critical function of 
the board of directors is to monitor managers’ 
performance (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Monitoring safeguards the investments of 
shareholders and protects the interests of various 
stakeholders against management’s self-interest.  
Numerous studies have investigated those 
characteristics that enable boards to increase their 
efficiency and firm performance (e.g. Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; 
Finkelstein and D’Averi, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 
1995). The results of these previous studies are 
mixed, however. Most list independent directors 
and dual leadership as important factors.  
The role of independent directors on the 
board is to provide the objectivity necessary to 
properly ratify and monitor decisions of the firm’s 
managers. The importance of effective board 
composition has been discussed extensively in the 
literature. Fama and Jensen (1983) found that 
independent directors are more efficient in 
facilitating the governance functions of the board. 
Beasley (1996) showed that the proportion of 
independent directors on the board is significantly 
and negatively associated with financial statement 
fraud. O’Sullivan (2000) investigated the 
relationship between audit fees and board 
independence for a sample of UK listed companies 
and found that having a greater proportion of 
independent directors is associated with more 
expensive audits. 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) and 
the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
(2004) emphasized the role of non-executive 
directors who should bring a broader view to the 
company’s activities and greater independence and 
objectivity to board decisions, and the importance 
of an independent chairman.  The role of the 
chairman is to monitor and evaluate the 
performance of the CEO and executive directors on 
the board. However, this process might be impeded 
when the same person occupies the position of 
chairman and CEO.  
The importance of having an independent 
chairman and threats of CEO duality were also 
discussed by Jensen (1993). He argued that 
corporate officers who report to the CEO cannot be 
effective in monitoring and evaluating CEO 
performance. Furthermore, Pi and Timme (1993) 
found that firms with separated functions 
outperform firms where CEO duality exists. 
Russian Corporate Law “On Joint Stock 
Companies” follows best corporate governance 
practice by prohibiting a CEO from holding the 
position of chairman. However, it is common for 
boards of directors in Russia to have an executive 
director as a chairman, leading to chairman duality. 
The presence of independent directors on the board 
increases demand for quality audit services from 
the external auditor (Lifschutz et al., 2010) so as to 
give additional assurance and confidence to 
shareholders.  Hence, this will result in higher audit 
fees as the scope of audit work increases. Based on 
the preceding discussion, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Audit fees are associated positively with the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. 
 
H2: The presence of an independent chairman on 
the board has a positive association with audit 
fees. 
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Prior studies have used the presence of State 
representatives on the board as one of the proxies 
for political connections of the firm (Gul, 2006). 
Firms in countries with more State involvement in 
the economy are perceived to speed the recognition 
of good news and to slow the recognition of bad 
news in earnings of firms in countries with less 
political involvement in the economy (Bushman 
and Piotroski, 2006). Politically connected firms are 
believed to be associated with higher inherent risk, 
resulting in an increase in the scope of audit work 
and higher audit fees. Prior studies have found that 
there is positive association between audit fees and 
politically connected firms (Gul, 2006). This leads 
us to the following: 
 
H3: There is a positive association between the 
proportion of representatives of the State on the 
board and audit fees. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample  
 
Our sample is comprised of the top 147 non-finance 
companies listed on Russian Trading System (RTS) 
stock exchange who disclose the information 
regarding their audit fees. As Table 1 shows, our 
sample includes companies from a wide cross-
section of industries. 
 
Table 1. Industry representation of companies in the sample 
 
Industries  % 
Mining and exploration 4% 
Engineering 4% 
Metallurgy 4% 
Development 5% 
Energy 7% 
Oil and gas 20% 
Chemical 4% 
Food 5% 
Telco 11% 
Transport and logistics 14% 
Retail 13% 
Other 10% 
 
In accordance with the Federal Law on Joint Stock 
Companies, companies need to prepare annual 
reports and have them audited. Listed companies 
are also required to comply with the requirements 
of the CCG (Appendix B) and disclose their 
financial information according to either IFRS or 
US GAAP. For the purpose of consistency, we use 
financial reports prepared according to IFRS/US 
GAAP in our study. 
 
3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variable  
 
We use an OLS regression model to estimate the 
predictive importance of the independent variables 
by comparing beta weights. The audit fee model is 
evaluated using 2008 fiscal-year data. Year 2008 is 
chosen as it reflects a relatively stable application 
of the CCG introduced in 2002 and changes in the 
listing rules of Russian stock exchanges in 2006 
that are related to the composition of boards of 
directors (RTS, 2006; MICEX, 2006). 
The data are obtained from the Osiris 
database and hand collection from publicly 
available Russian annual reports, financial 
statements and company announcements. 
Consistent with Simunic (1980) we use the natural 
log of audit fees to avoid problems of 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
3.2.2. Experimental variables 
 
To test hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, we examine 
three variables that reflect the hypothesized 
relationships between chairman independence, 
board members independence, presence of a 
representative of the State as board members, and 
audit fees. The variables of interest are the 
proportion of independent directors on the board 
(INDBD), proportion of representatives of the State 
(STATEBD) and the dummy variable INDC that 
shows independence of the chairman of the board: 
 
1. Chairman independence (INDC): measures 
the effect of the presence of an independent 
chairman on audit fees. INDC is set equal to 1 if a 
chairman of the board is an independent director, 0 
otherwise. 
2. Proportion of independent directors on the 
board (INDBD): reflects the effect of independent 
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directors on the board on audit fees. INDBD is 
defined as the proportion of independent directors 
on the board to the total number of members on the 
board. 
3. Proportion of State representatives on the 
board (STATEBD): defines the effect of the 
presence and proportion of representatives of the 
State as board members on the board. It is measured 
as the proportion of State representatives on the 
board to the total number of board members.   
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 
The other variables in the model are size, 
proportion of shares owned by directors, Big 4 
auditors, current ratio, market to book value of 
equity, return on equity, leverage, proportion of 
foreign subsidiaries and loss incurrence. These 
variables were identified from prior literature with 
preference for recent research [2] as shown in Table 
2). 
 
Table 2. Control variables 
 
Variable Acrony
m 
Predicte
d sign 
Measurement Reason Prior studies 
Size  LnTA + Natural log of 
client’s total 
assets at year 
end to avoid  
problems of 
heteroscedastici
ty 
Total assets are used as 
proxy. Large 
companies require 
more audit work due to 
larger amount of 
transactions, account 
balances, greater 
importance of 
disclosure 
Simunic (1980),  
Fransis (1984),  
Simon et al. (1986),  
Low et al (1990),  
Simon et al (1992),  
Chan et al (1993),  
Johnson et al (1995), 
Collier and Gregory (1996),  
Naser and Nuseibeh (2007) 
Current 
ratio 
CRE - Current assets 
divided by total 
liabilities 
Short-term solvency 
proxy 
Simunic (1980) 
Return on 
equity 
ROE + EBIT divided 
by total equity 
The higher a client 
profitability, the higher 
the audit risk and audit 
fees 
Simunic (1980),  
Tsui et al. (2001) 
Leverage DEBT + Total liabilities 
divided by total 
equity 
Long-term solvency 
proxy 
Simunic (1980), 
Foreign 
subsidiarie
s 
FOR + Proportion of 
foreign 
subsidiaries to 
total 
subsidiaries 
Companies with 
greater proportion of 
foreign 
subsidiaries/branches  
require more audit 
work as companies 
need to comply with 
reporting requirements 
in the countries where 
they operate. 
Tylor and Baker (1981),  
Collier and Gregory (1996),  
Sandra and Patrick (1996),  
Chan et al. (1993) 
Loss LOSS - Dummy 
variable, 1 if 
loss occurred 
during the year, 
0 otherwise 
Auditors charge lower 
fees to distressed 
clients to improve 
goodwill and mitigate 
the effect of client risk 
Simunic (1980), 
Firth (1985),  
Chung and Lindsay (1988),  
Low et al (1990), 
Craswell et al. (1995), 
Gul and Tsui, (1998), 
Gul (1999),  
Tsui et al. (2001) 
Big 4 
auditor 
AUDITO
R 
+ Dummy 
variable, 1 if the 
firm audited by 
a Big 4 audit 
firm, 0 
otherwise 
Big 4 audit firms 
possess a higher level 
of industry skills and 
expertise and charge 
higher fees. 
Simunic (1980), 
Francis (1984), 
Craswell et al. (1995), 
Gul and Tsui, (1998), 
Gul (1999),  
Tsui et al. (2001) 
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3.3. Regression Model 
 
This study uses the traditional audit fee model 
adapted from prior research by Simunic (1980) and 
Craswell et al. (1995). 
 
 
 
      LnAF = b0 + b1INDC + b2INDBD + b3STATEBD + b4AUDITOR + b5LnTA+ b6CRE + b7 ROE+ b8DEBT 
+ b9FOR + b10LOSS + e       
 
Variables: 
Dependent variable 
LnAF = natural log of audit fees charged to the client 
 Experimental variables 
INDC = ‘1’ if chairman of the board is independent director, ‘0’ otherwise 
INDBD = proportion of independent directors on the board 
STATEBD = proportion of representatives of the State on the board 
Control variables 
AUDITOR = ‘1’ if the firm audited by a Big 4 audit firm, ‘0’ otherwise 
LnTA   = natural log of client’s total assets at year end 
CRE = current ratio 
ROE   = EBIT divided by total equity 
DEBT = total liabilities divided by total equity 
FOR = proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries 
LOSS = ‘1’ if loss incurred during the year, ‘0’ otherwise 
 
  
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for both dependent and 
independent variables are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Raw data 
AuditFEE (US$000) 15.84 64,000.00 7,193.70 10,476.67 
INDC 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 
INDBD 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.20 
STATEBD  0.00 0.50 0.02 0.08 
AUDITOR 0.00 1.00 0.81 0.39 
ASSETS (US$000 000) 13.70 20,823.00 1,943.87 2,785.29 
CRE 0.17 37.13 1.94 3.99 
ROE 0.00 28.14 1.93 4.08 
DEBT 0.00 1.39 0.38 0.24 
LOSS 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.44 
FOR 0.00 0.88 0.04 0.14 
Transformed data 
LnAF 10.00 18.00 15.25 1.58 
LnTA 16.00 24.00 20.59 1.42 
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Table 3 shows the audit fees (AuditFEE) for the 
listed Russian companies vary from US$15,840 to 
US$64,000,000 with a mean of US$7,193,700. 
Total assets used as a proxy for firm size (FSIZE) 
range from US$13.7 million to US$20.8 billion 
with a mean US$1.94 billion. As anticipated earlier, 
the audit fees and total assets variables are skewed 
positively. We have reduced this skewness by using 
the natural log for those variables. 
The chairman is an independent director 
(INDC) for 48% of firms. Independent directors 
(INDBD) constitute 40% of boards of directors. 
Representatives of the State (STATEBD) constitute 
2% of board members, on average. Auditors from 
the Big 4 (AUDITOR) worked with 81% of the 
firms.  The proportion of firms that recorded a loss 
for the sample period is 25%. 
 
4.2. Correlations 
 
Table 4 represents the results of the bivariate 
Pearson correlation test between all the variables. 
The results show that the log of audit fees (LnFA) 
is correlated significantly and positively with 
LnTA, AUDITOR, INDC, INDBD, STATEBD and 
LOSS.  INDBD is correlated positively with LnTA, 
AUDITOR and CRE. STATEBD is correlated 
positively with INDBD, LnTA and CRE
. 
Dependent variable: 
AuditFEE (US$000) = audit fee 
LnAF = natural log of audit fees charged to the client 
Independent variables: 
INDC = dummy variable, 1 if chairman of the board is independent  director, 0 
otherwise STATEBD  = proportion of representative of the State on the board 
INDBD = proportion of independent directors on the board 
Control variables: 
AUDITOR = dummy variable, 1 if the firm audited by a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise 
ASSETS (US$000) = total assets 
LnTA = natural log of client’s total assets at year end 
CRE = current ratio 
ROE = return on equity 
DEBT = total liabilities divided by total assets 
FOR = number of foreign subsidiaries 
LOSS = dummy variable, 1 if loss occurred during the year, 0 otherwise 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients 
 LnAF INDC STATEBD INDBD AUDITOR LnTA CRE ROE DEBT FOR LOSS 
LnAF 1.000                    
INDC 0.234** 1.000                  
STATEBD 0.317** 0.067 1.000         
INDBD 0.480** 0.183* 0.281** 1.000               
AUDITOR 0.338** 0.053 -0.100 0.333** 1.000             
LnTA 0.634** 0.126 0.321** 0.452** 0.349** 1.000           
CRE 0.154 0.060  0.172* 0.162* 0.097 0.152 1.000         
ROE -0.013 0.065 -0.080 -0.156 -0.021 -0.250** 0.002 1.000       
DEBT 0.090 -0.038 -0.026 0.156 -0.065 0.023 -0.275** -0.211** 1.000     
FOR 0.060 0.138 -0.094 -0.011 0.118 0.149 -0.048 -0.105 0.245** 1.000   
LOSS -0.273** -0.090 -0.158 -0.087 0.002 -0.233** -0.129 -0.173* 0.140 0.052 1.000 
**Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).            *Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Variables: 
LnAF = natural log of audit fees charged to the client 
INDC = dummy variable, 0 if chairman of the board is independent (non-executive) director, 1 otherwise 
INDBD = proportion of independent directors on the board 
STATEBD = proportion of representative of the State on the board 
AUDITOR = dummy variable, 1 if the firm audited by a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise 
CRE = current ratio 
ROE = return on equity 
DEBT = total liabilities divided by total assets 
FOR = number of foreign subsidiaries 
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4.3. Regression analysis 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the multivariate linear 
regression analysis of the audit fee models. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Multiple regression results 
 
Control Variables coefficient t-value p-value 
(Constant) 2.911 1.732 0.086 
LnTA 0.524 6.141 0.000 
CRE 0.016 0.618 0.538 
ROE 0.054 2.137 0.034 
DEBT 0.902 2.078 0.040 
FOR -0.488 -0.688 0.493 
LOSS -0.397 -1.713 0.089 
AUDITOR 0.579 2.096 0.038 
 
  
Experimental variables:     
INDC 0.387 1.994 0.048 
INDBD 1.169 2.009 0.047 
STATEBD 1.661 1.755 0.081 
    
F-statistic (p-value) < 0.0001   
Adjusted R2 0.49   
 
Variables: 
INDC = dummy variable, 0 if chairman of the board is independent (non-executive) 
director, 1 otherwise 
INDBD =  proportion of independent directors on the board 
STATEBD =  proportion of representative of the State on the board 
AUDITOR = dummy variable, 1 if the firm audited by a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise 
LnTA =  natural log of client’s total assets at year end 
CRE =  current ratio 
ROE =  return on equity 
DEBT =  total liabilities divided by total assets 
FOR =  number of foreign subsidiaries 
LOSS =  dummy variable, 1 if loss occurred during the year, 0 otherwise 
 
As shown in Table 5 the model is highly 
significant at p<0.001. The explanatory power 
reflected by its adjusted R2 of 0.49 is consistent 
with prior studies (Bliss et al., 2007; Wang et al., 
2009). To examine potential multicollinearity in the 
regression model, we regressed all the explanatory 
variables on LnAF. The results indicate that the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is below 1.6 and 
tolerance levels are above 0.6 for all the 
explanatory variables. This suggests that 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables 
is not likely to pose a serious problem in 
interpretation of the regression results. 
The coefficients for ROE, LnTA, INDC, 
INDBD, AUDITOR, DEBT and STATEDB are 
significant at 0.01, 0.05, or 0.1 levels and positive. 
The coefficient for CRE is not significant, although 
it has a positive sign. The coefficient for LOSS is 
significant at 0.1 and negative. The coefficient for 
FOR is not significant, although it has a negative 
sign, consistent with our hypothesis. Our 
experimental variables follow the predicted 
behaviour. The coefficients for INDC, INDBD, and 
STATEDB are significant and positive.  
The results support hypotheses H1, H2 and 
H3. The higher level of corporate governance 
within a firm will lead to demand for high quality 
audit assurance and will result in higher audit fees. 
These results are consistent with studies by 
Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003), 
among others. Also, the results show that a high 
proportion of State representatives on the board is 
associated with high audit fees. This supports the 
hypothesis that the increased inherent risk in 
politically connected firms will result in higher 
audit fees (Gul, 2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 
2006). 
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5. Summary and conclusions  
 
We find that audit fees are associated positively 
with the presence of an independent chairman, the 
higher of proportion of independent directors and 
State representatives on the board. These results are 
consistent with the demand-side perspective of 
audit services where good corporate governance 
practices demand for a higher level of audit 
assurance and result in higher audit fees. 
The results support the view that the reforms 
of the Russian government have had a positive 
effect on the application of the corporate 
governance regime. It is perceived that Russia as a 
past communist State is linked to high level 
corruption and immaturity of corporate governance 
structures. The introduction of the CCG was a big 
step to align Russia with effective corporate 
governance practices in the international 
community. Many politicians argue that regulations 
to prevent CEO duality and increase the number of 
independent directors on the board have had a 
superficial effect rather than trigger any radical 
changes at the corporate level. However, our results 
suggest that the above mentioned measures have 
increased the demand for higher quality audit and, 
thus, have stimulated positive changes in the quality 
of the financial information disclosure.  
This study raises an important question 
about the role of State representatives on boards of 
directors. Do they actually safeguard State property 
and ensure transparency as their role implies? Or do 
they promote corruption and fraud? The positive 
association between the proportion of State 
representatives and audit fees suggests some ideas 
for further investigation. It shows positive 
association with inherent audit risk and leads 
indirectly to a conclusion about negative effects of 
State representatives on corporate management. 
The results have implications for regulatory 
bodies in Russia. They show areas that require 
further improvement. It seems critical to ensure the 
appointment of independent directors who have 
appropriate knowledge and experience, and capable 
of adhering to the best practices of information 
transparency and disclosure, and of ensuring a high 
level of corporate governance at State-owned 
enterprises.  
The results should be considered in the light 
of several limitations. First, the sample is limited to 
2008 year data of public listed non-finance 
companies who disclose their audit fee data 
voluntarily. Second, the focus of this study is on 
board composition variables. This imposes further 
limitations to the generalizability of the results. 
Future research could consider other corporate 
governance variables which may affect the 
perceived inherent riskiness of Russian companies. 
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Appendix A. Extract from the CCG on Independent Directors on Board of directors 
 
2.2. It is recommended that the board of directors should include independent Directors  
 
2.2.1. As a rule, boards of directors of Russian companies consist of three categories of directors – executive, 
non-executive and independent directors. 
Under the law, executive directors are defined as members of the board of directors concurrently holding 
positions as members of the managerial board, and their number may not exceed one-fourth of the total number 
of members of the board of directors of the company. At the same time, including in the board of directors only 
those persons who are not members of the managerial board does not in itself guarantee adequate protection of 
the interests of shareholders. 
Efficient performance by the board of directors of its functions requires that some of its members are 
independent directors, i.e., persons who not only do not serve as members of the managerial board, but are also 
independent from the officers of the company and their affiliated persons and from major business partners of 
the company, and do not have any other relations with the company that may affect the independence of their 
opinions (a detailed discussion of the requirements for independent directors is provided in Paragraph 2.2.2 of 
this Chapter). 
 
2.2.2. Independent directors can make a substantial contribution to consideration and resolution of such matters 
as preparation of the company’s development strategy, evaluation of executive bodies’ performance in terms of 
implementation of such strategy, resolution of corporate conflicts that involve shareholders, and a number of 
other matters that may affect the interests of shareholders. Therefore, independent directors ensure that the board 
of directors forms an objective opinion on matters under discussion, which ultimately increases investor 
confidence in the company. 
In defining eligibility criteria for independent directors, the company should consider their ability to make 
independent judgments. This means that there should be no factors capable of affecting their position. Therefore, 
it is advisable that an independent director should be a director who:  
 
(1) over the last three years has not been, and at the time of election to the board of directors is not, an officer 
(manager) or employee of the company, or an officer or employee of the managing organization of the company; 
 
(2) is not an officer of another company in which any of the officers of the company is a member of the 
appointments and remuneration committee of the board of directors; 
 
(3) is not an affiliated person of an officer (manager) of the company (officer of the company's managing 
organization); 
 
(4) is not an affiliated person of the company or an affiliated person of such affiliated persons; 
 
(5) is not bound by contractual relations with the company, whereby the person may acquire property (receive 
monies) with a value in excess of 10 percent of such person’s aggregate annual income, other than through 
receipt of remuneration for participation in the operations of the board of directors; 
 
(6) is not a major business partner of the company (a business partner with an annual value of transactions with 
the company in excess of 10 percent of the asset value of the company); and 
 
(7) is not a representative of the government. 
 
No director may be deemed to be independent if he has acted in the capacity of a member of the board of 
directors of the company for 7 years. 
 
2.2.5. It is advisable that information about independent directors is disclosed in the annual report of the 
company. 
Notes 
 
[1] No fewer than 5 directors for companies with fewer than 1,000 voting shareholders, no fewer than 7 directors 
for companies with fewer than 10,000 voting shareholders (but more than 1,000 voting shareholders) and no 
fewer than 9 directors for companies with 10,000 or more voting shareholders 
[2] Hay et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive overview of basic research on audit fees, including a discussion of 
the various variables used to explain audit fees. 
